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Abstract
We study a basic private estimation problem: each of n users draws a single i.i.d.
sample from an unknown Gaussian distribution N(µ,σ2), and the goal is to esti-
mate µ while guaranteeing local differential privacy for each user. As minimizing
the number of rounds of interaction is important in the local setting, we provide
adaptive two-round solutions and nonadaptive one-round solutions to this prob-
lem. We match these upper bounds with an information-theoretic lower bound
showing that our accuracy guarantees are tight up to logarithmic factors for all
sequentially interactive locally private protocols.
1 Introduction
Differential privacy is a formal algorithmic guarantee that no single input has a large effect on
the output of a computation. Since its introduction [14], a rich line of work has made differential
privacy a compelling privacy guarantee (see Dwork et al. [15] and Vadhan [26] for surveys), and
deployments of differential privacy now exist at many organizations, including Apple [2], Google [5,
16], Microsoft [11], Mozilla [3], and the US Census Bureau [1, 22].
Much recent attention, including almost all industrial deployments, has focused on a variant called
local differential privacy [4, 14, 21]. In the local model private data is distributed across many
users, and each user privatizes their data before the data is collected by an analyst. Thus, as any
locally differentially private computation runs on already-privatized data, data contributors need not
worry about compromised data analysts or insecure communication channels. In contrast, (global)
differential privacy assumes that the data analyst has secure, trusted access to the unprivatized data.
However, the stronger privacy guarantees of the local model come at a price. For many problems,
a locally private solution requires far more samples than a globally private solution [10, 13, 21, 25].
Here, we study the basic problem of locally private Gaussian estimation: given n users each holding
an i.i.d. draw from an unknown Gaussian distribution N(µ,σ2), can an analyst accurately estimate
the mean µ while guaranteeing local differential privacy for each user?
On the technical front, locally private Gaussian estimation captures two general challenges in locally
private learning. First, since data is drawn from a Gaussian, there is no a priori (worst-case) bound
on the scale of the observations. Naive applications of standard privatization methods like Laplace
and Gaussian mechanisms must add noise proportional to the worst-case scale of the data and are
thus infeasible. Second, protocols requiring many rounds of user-analyst interaction are difficult to
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implement in real-world systems and may incur much longer running times. Network latency as well
as server and user liveness constraints compound this difficulty [24]. It is therefore desirable to limit
the number of rounds of interaction between users and the data analyst. Finally, besides being a fun-
damental learning problem, Gaussian estimation has several real-world applications (e.g. telemetry
data analysis [11]) where one may assume that users’ behavior follows a Guassian distribution.
1.1 Our Contributions
We divide our solution to locally private Gaussian estimation into two cases. In the first case, σ
is known to the analyst, and in the second case σ is unknown but bounded in known [σmin, σmax].
For each case, we provide an (ε,0)-locally private adaptive two-round protocol and nonadaptive
one-round protocol4. Our privacy guarantees are worst-case; however, when x1, . . . , xn ∼N(µ,σ2)
we also get the following accuracy guarantees.
Theorem 1.1 (Informal). When σ is known, and n is sufficiently large, there exists two-round pro-
tocol outputting µˆ such that ∣µˆ − µ∣ = O (σ
ε
√
log(1/β)
n
) with probability 1 − β, and there exists
one-round protocol outputting µˆ such that ∣µˆ − µ∣ = O (σ
ε
√
log(1/β)√log(n)
n
) with probability 1 − β.
Theorem 1.2 (Informal). When σ is unknown but bounded in known [σmin, σmax], and n is suffi-
ciently large, there exists two-round protocol outputting µˆ such that ∣µˆ−µ∣ = O (σ
ε
√
log(1/β) log(n)
n
)
with probability 1 − β, and there exists one-round protocol outputting µˆ such that ∣µˆ − µ∣ =
O (σ
ε
√
log([σmax/σmin]+1) log(1/β) log3/2(n)
n
) with probability 1 − β.
All of our protocols are sequentially interactive [13]: each user interacts with the protocol at most
once. We match these upper bounds with a lower bound showing that our results are tight for all
sequentially interactive locally private protocols up to logarithmic factors. We obtain this result by
introducing tools from the strong data processing inequality literature [6, 23]. Using subsequent
work by Joseph et al. [18], we can also extend this lower bound to fully interactive protocols.
Theorem 1.3 (Informal). For a given σ, there does not exist an (ε, δ)-locally private protocol A
such that for any µ = O (σ
ε
√
1
n
), given x1, . . . , xn ∼ N(µ,σ2), A outputs estimate µˆ satisfying
∣µˆ − µ∣ = o(σ
ε
√
1
n
) with probability ≥ 15/16.
1.2 Related Work
Several works have already studied differentially private versions of various statistical tasks, espe-
cially in the global setting. Karwa and Vadhan [20] and Kamath et al. [19] consider similar ver-
sions of Gaussian estimation under global differential privacy, respectively in the one-dimensional
and high-dimensional cases. For both the known and unknown variance cases, Karwa and Vad-
han [20] offer an O (σ√ log(1/β)
n
+ poly log(1/β)
εn
) accuracy upper bound for estimating µ. Since an
Ω(σ√ log(1/β)
n
) accuracy lower bound holds even without privacy, our upper and lower bounds
show that local privacy adds a roughly
√
n accuracy cost over global privacy.
In concurrent independent work, Gaboardi et al. [17] also study locally private Gaussian estimation.
We match or better their accuracy results with much lower round complexity. They provide adaptive
protocols for the known- and unknown-σ settings, with the latter protocol having round complexity
T as large as Ω(n), linear in the number of users. In contrast, we provide both adaptive and non-
adaptive solutions, and our protocols all have round complexity T ≤ 2. A full comparison appears
in Figure 1.
Gaboardi et al. [17] also prove a tight lower bound for nonadaptive protocols that can be extended to
sequentially interactive protocols. We provide a lower bound that is tight for sequentially interactive
4As “adaptive” and “nonadaptive” are implicit in “two-round” and “one-round”, we often omit these terms.
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Gaboardi et al. [17] This Work
Setting Accuracy α, Round Complexity T Accuracy α, Round Complexity T
Known σ,
adaptive α = O
⎛⎜⎝σε
√
log( 1
β
) log(n
β
) log( 1
δ
)
n
⎞⎟⎠
T = 2
α = O
⎛⎜⎝σε
√
log( 1
β
)
n
⎞⎟⎠
T = 2
Known σ,
nonadaptive – α = O
⎛⎜⎝σε
√
log( 1
β
)√log(n)
n
⎞⎟⎠
T = 1
Unknown σ,
adaptive α = O
⎛⎜⎝σε
√
log( 1
β
) log(n
β
) log( 1
δ
)
n
⎞⎟⎠
T = Ω(log ( R
σmin
))
α = O
⎛⎜⎝σε
√
log( 1
β
) log(n)
n
⎞⎟⎠
T = 2
Unknown σ,
nonadaptive – α = O
⎛⎜⎝σε
√
log(σmax
σmin
+1) log( 1
β
) log3/2(n)
n
⎞⎟⎠
T = 1
Figure 1: A comparison of upper bounds in Gaboardi et al. [17] and here. In all cases, Gaboardi et al.
[17] use (ε, δ)-locally private algorithms and we use (ε,0). Here,R denotes an upper bound on both
µ and σ. In our setting, the upper bound on µ is O(2nε2/ log(n/β)), leading the unknown variance
protocol of Gaboardi et al. [17] to round complexity potentially as large as Ω˜(nε2/ log(1/β)).
protocols up to logarithmic factors, and we depart from previous local privacy lower bounds by
introducing tools from the strong data processing inequality (SDPI) literature [6, 23]. This approach
uses an SDPI to control how much information a sample gives about its generating distribution,
then uses existing local privacy results to bound the mutual information between a sample and the
privatized output from that sample. Subsequent work by Duchi and Rogers [12] generalizes the
SDPI framework to prove lower bounds for a broader class of problems in local privacy. They also
extend the SDPI framework to prove lower bounds for fully interactive algorithms.
2 Preliminaries
We consider a setting where, for each i ∈ [n], user i’s datum is a single draw from an unknownGaus-
sian distribution, xi ∼ N(µ,σ2), and these draws are i.i.d. In our communication protocol, users
may exchange messages over public channels with a single (possibly untrusted) central analyst.5
The analyst’s task is to accurately estimate µ while guaranteeing local differential privacy for each
user.
To minimize interaction with any single user, we restrict our attention to sequentially interactive
protocols. In these protocols, every user sends at most a single message in the entire protocol. We
also study the round complexity of these interactive protocols. Formally, one round of interaction in
a protocol consists of the following two steps: 1) the analyst selects a subset of users S ⊆ [n], along
with a set of randomizers {Qi ∣ i ∈ S}, and 2) each user i in S publishes a message yi = Qi(xi).
A randomized algorithm is differentially private if arbitrarily changing a single input does not change
the output distribution “too much”. This preserves privacy because the output distribution is insen-
sitive to any change of a single user’s data. We study a stronger privacy guarantee called local
differential privacy. In the local model, each user i computes their message using a local random-
5The notion of a central coordinating analyst is only a useful simplification. As the analyst has no special
powers or privileges, any user, or the protocol itself, can be viewed as playing the same role.
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izer. A local randomizer is a differentially private algorithm taking a single-element database as
input.
Definition 2.1 (Local Randomizer). A randomized function Qi∶X → Y is an (ε, δ)-local random-
izer if, for every pair of observations xi, x
′
i ∈ X and any S ⊆ Y , Pr[Qi(xi) ∈ S] ≤ eεPr[Qi(x′i) ∈
S] + δ.
A protocol is locally private if every user computes their message using a local randomizer. In a
sequentially interactive protocol, the local randomizer for user i may be chosen adaptively based on
previous messages z1, . . . , zi−1. However, the choice of randomizer cannot be based on user i’s data.
Definition 2.2. A sequentially interactive protocol A is (ε, δ)-locally private for private user data{x1, . . . , xn} if, for every user i ∈ [n], the message Yi is computed using an (ε, δ)-local randomizer
Qi. When δ > 0, we say A is approximately locally private. If δ = 0, A is purely locally private.
3 Estimating µ with Known σ
We beginwith the case whereσ2 is known (shorthanded “KV”). In Section 3.1, we provide a protocol
KVGAUSSTIMATE that requires two rounds of analyst-user interaction. In Section 3.2, we provide a
protocol 1ROUNDKVGAUSSTIMATE achieving a weaker accuracy guarantee in a single round. All
omitted pseudocode and proofs appear in the Supplement.
3.1 Two-round Protocol KVGAUSSTIMATE
In KVGAUSSTIMATE the users are split into halves U1 and U2. In round one, the analyst queries
users in U1 to obtain an O(σ)-accurate estimate µˆ1 of µ. In round two, the analyst passes µˆ1 to
users in U2, who respond based on µˆ1 and their own data. The analyst then aggregates this second
set of responses into a better final estimate of µ.
Theorem 3.1. Two-round protocol KVGAUSSTIMATE satisfies (ε,0)-local differential privacy for
x1, . . . , xn and, if x1, . . . , xn ∼iid N(µ,σ2) where σ is known and nlog(n) = Ω( log(µ) log(1/β)ε2 ), with
probability 1 − β outputs µˆ such that ∣µˆ − µ∣ = O (σ
ε
√
log(1/β)
n
).
Algorithm 1 KVGAUSSTIMATE
Input: ε, k,L, n, σ,U1, U2
1: for j ∈ L do
2: for user i ∈ U j1 do
3: User i outputs y˜i ← RR1(ε, i, j)
4: end for
5: end for ⊳ End of round 1
6: Analyst computes Hˆ1 ← KVAGG1(ε, k,L, U1)
7: Analyst computes µˆ1 ← ESTMEAN(β, ε, Hˆ1, k,L)
8: for user i ∈ U2 do
9: User i outputs y˜i ← KVRR2(ε, i, µˆ1, σ)
10: end for ⊳ End of round 2
11: Analyst computes Hˆ2 ← KVAGG2(ε,n/2, U2)
12: Analyst computes Tˆ ←√2 ⋅ erf−1 ( 2(−Hˆ2(−1)+Hˆ2(1))
n
)
13: Analyst outputs µˆ2 ← σTˆ + µˆ1
Output: Analyst estimate µˆ2 of µ
3.1.1 First round of KVGAUSSTIMATE
For neatness, let L = ⌊n/(2k)⌋, Lmin = ⌊log(σ)⌋, Lmax = Lmin − 1 + L, and L = {Lmin, Lmin +
1, . . . , Lmax}. U1 is then split into L subgroups indexed by L, and each subgroup has size k =
Ω( log(n/β)
ε2
). KVGAUSSTIMATE begins by iterating through each subgroup j ∈ L. Each user i ∈ U j1
releases a privatized version of ⌊xi/2j⌋ mod 4 via randomized response (RR1): with probability
4
eε/(eε + 3), user i outputs ⌊xi/2j⌋ mod 4, and otherwise outputs one of the remaining elements of{0,1,2,3} uniformly at random. Responses from group U j1 will be used to estimate the jth least
significant bit of µ (rounded to an integer). The analyst then uses KVAGG1 (“Known Variance
Aggregation”) to aggregate and debias responses to account for this randomness.
Algorithm 2 KVAGG1
Input: ε, k,L, U
1: for j ∈ L do
2: for a ∈ {0,1} do
3: Cj(a) ← ∣{y˜i ∣ i ∈ U j , y˜i = a}∣
4: Hˆj(a)← eε+3
eε−1 ⋅ (Cj(a) − keε+3)
5: end for
6: end for
7: Output Hˆ
Output: Aggregated histogram Hˆ of private user responses
The result is a collection of histograms Hˆ1. The analyst uses Hˆ1 in ESTMEAN to binary search for
µ. Intuitively, for each subgroupU j1 if all multiples of 2
j are far from µ then Gaussian concentration
implies that almost all users i ∈ U j1 compute the same value of ⌊x/2j⌋ mod 4. This produces a
histogram Hˆj1 where most elements fall concentrate in a single bin. The analyst in turn narrows
their search range for µ. For example, if HˆLmax1 concentrates in 0, then the range narrows to µ ∈[0,2Lmax); if HˆLmax−11 concentrates in 1, then the range narrows to µ ∈ [2Lmax−1,2Lmax), and so
on.
If instead some multiple of 2j is near µ, the elements of Hˆj1 will spread over multiple (adjacent)
bins. This is also useful: a point from the “middle” of this block of bins is O(σ)-close to µ. The
analyst thus takes such a point as µˆ1 and ends their search. Our analysis will also rely on having a
noticeably low-count bin that is non-adjacent to the bin containing µ. This motivates using 4 as a
modulus.
In this way, the analyst examines HˆLmax1 , Hˆ
Lmax−1
1 , . . . in sequence, estimating µ from most to least
significant bit. Crucially, the modulus structure of user responses enables the analyst to carry out
this binary search with one round of interaction. Thus at the end of the first round the analyst obtains
an O(σ)-accurate estimate µˆ1 of µ.
Algorithm 3 ESTMEAN
Input: β, ε, Hˆ1, k,L
1: ψ ← ( ε+4
ε
√
2
) ⋅√k ln(8L/β)
2: j ← Lmax
3: Ij ← [0,2Lmax]
4: while j ≥ Lmin andmaxa∈{0,1,2,3} Hˆj1(a) ≥ 0.52k +ψ do
5: Analyst computes integer c such that c2j ∈ Ij and c ≡M1(j) mod 4
6: Analyst computes Ij−1 ← [c2j , (c + 1)2j]
7: j ← j − 1
8: end while
9: j ←max(j,Lmin)
10: Analyst computesM1(j)← argmaxa∈{0,1,2,3} Hˆj1(a)
11: Analyst computesM2(j)← argmaxa∈{0,1,2,3}−{M1(j)} Hˆj1(a)
12: Analyst computes c∗ ← maximum integer such that c∗2j ∈ Ij and c∗ ≡M1(j) orM2(j) mod 4
13: Analyst outputs µˆ1 ← c∗2j
Output: Initial estimate µˆ1 of µ
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3.1.2 Second round of KVGAUSSTIMATE
In the second round, the analyst passes µˆ1 to users in U2. Users respond through KVRR2 (“Known
Variance Randomized Response”), a privatized version of an algorithm from the distributed statisti-
cal estimation literature [6]. In KVRR2, each user centers their point with µˆ1, standardizes it using
σ, and randomized responds on sgn((xi − µˆ1)/σ). This crucially relies on the first estimate µˆ1, as
properly centering requires an initial O(σ)-accurate estimate of µˆ. The analyst can then aggregate
these responses by a debiasing process KVAGG2 akin to KVAGG1.
Algorithm 4 KVRR2
Input: ε, i, µˆ1, σ
1: User i computes x′i ← (xi − µˆ1)/σ
2: User i computes yi ← sgn(x′i)
3: User i computes c ∼U [0,1]
4: if c ≤ eε
eε+1 then
5: User i publishes y˜i ← yi
6: else
7: User i publishes y˜i ← −yi
8: end if
Output: Private centered user estimate y˜i
Algorithm 5 KVAGG2
Input: ε, k,U
1: for a ∈ {−1,1} do
2: C(a) ← ∣{y˜i ∣ i ∈ U, y˜i = a}∣
3: Hˆ(a)← eε+1
eε−1 ⋅ (C(a) − keε+1)
4: end for
5: Analyst outputs Hˆ
Output: Aggregated histogram Hˆ of private user responses
From this aggregation Hˆ2, the analyst obtains a good estimate of the bias of the initial estimate µˆ1.
If µˆ1 < µ, responses will skew toward 1, and if µˆ1 > µ responses will skew toward −1. By comparing
this skew to the true standard CDF using the error function erf, the analyst recovers a better final
estimate µˆ2 of µ (Lines 12-13 of KVGAUSSTIMATE). Privacy of KVGAUSSTIMATE follows from
the privacy of the randomized response mechanisms RR1 and KVRR2.
3.2 One-round Protocol 1ROUNDKVGAUSSTIMATE
Recall that in KVGAUSSTIMATE the analyst 1) employs user pool U1 to compute rough estimate µˆ1
and 2) adaptively refines this estimate using responses from the second user pool U2. 1ROUNDKV-
GAUSSTIMATE executes these two rounds of KVGAUSSTIMATE simultaneously by parallelization.
Theorem 3.2. One-round protocol 1ROUNDKVGAUSSTIMATE satisfies (ε,0)-local differential
privacy for x1, . . . , xn and, if x1, . . . , xn ∼iid N(µ,σ2) where σ is known and nlog(n) =
Ω( log(µ) log(1/β)
ε2
), with probability 1 − β outputs µˆ such that
∣µˆ − µ∣ = O (σ
ε
√
log(1/β)√log(n)
n
) .
1ROUNDKVGAUSSTIMATE splits U2 into Θ(√log(n)) subgroups that run the second-round pro-
tocol from KVGAUSSTIMATE with different values of µˆ1. Intuitively, it suffices that at least one
subgroup centers using a µˆ1 near µ: the analyst can then use the data from that subgroup and discard
the rest. By Gaussian concentration, most user samples cluster within O(σ√log(n)) of µ, so each
subgroup U j2 receives a set of points S(j) interspersed Θ(σ√log(n)) apart on the real line, and
each user i ∈ U j2 centers using the point in S(j) closest to xi. This leads us to use Θ(√log(n))
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groups with each point in S(j + 1) shifted Θ(σ) from the corresponding point in S(j). By doing
so, we ensure that some subgroup has most of its users center using a point within O(σ) of µ.
In summary, 1ROUNDKVGAUSSTIMATE works as follows: after collecting the single round of
responses from U1 and U2, the analyst computes µˆ1 using responses from U1. By comparing µˆ1
and S(j) for each j, the analyst then selects the subgroup U j∗2 where most users centered using
a value in S(j∗) closest to µˆ1. This mimics the effect of adaptively passing µˆ1 to the users in
U
j∗
2 , so the analyst simply processes the responses from U
j∗
2 as it processed responses from U2 in
KVGAUSSTIMATE. Because U j
∗
2 contains Θ(n/√log(n)) users, the cost is a log1/4(n) factor in
accuracy.
4 Unknown Variance
In this section, we consider the more general problem with unknown variance σ2 (shorthanded
“UV”) that lies in known interval [σmin, σmax]. We again provide a two-round protocol
UVGAUSSTIMATE and a slightly less accurate one-round protocol 1ROUNDUVGAUSSTIMATE.
4.1 Two-round Protocol
UVGAUSSTIMATE is structurally similar to KVGAUSSTIMATE. In round one, the analyst uses the
responses of half of the users to roughly estimate µ, and in round two the analyst passes this estimate
to the second half of users for improvement. However, two key differences now arise. First, since
σ is unknown, the analyst must now also estimate σ in round one. Second, since the analyst does
not have a very accurate estimate of σ, the refinement process of the second round employs Laplace
noise rather than the CDF comparison used in KVGAUSSTIMATE.
Theorem 4.1. Two-round protocol UVGAUSSTIMATE satisfies (ε,0)-local differential privacy for
x1, . . . , xn and, if x1, . . . , xn ∼iid N(µ,σ2)where σ is unknown but bounded in known [σmin, σmax]
and n
log(n) = Ω( [log( σmaxσmin +1)+log(µ)] log( 1β )ε2 ), with probability at least 1 − β outputs µˆ such that
∣µˆ − µ∣ = O (σ
ε
√
log(1/β) log(n)
n
) .
Algorithm 6 UVGAUSSTIMATE
Input: ε, k1,L1, n, σ,U1, U2
1: for j ∈ L1 do
2: for user i ∈ U j1 do
3: User i outputs y˜i ← RR1(ε, i, j)
4: end for
5: end for ⊳ End of round 1
6: Analyst computes Hˆ1 ← AGG1(ε,L1, U1)
7: Analyst computes σˆ ← ESTVAR(β, ε, Hˆ1, k1,L1)
8: Analyst computes Hˆ2 ← KVAGG1(ε, k1,L1, U1)
9: Analyst computes µˆ1 ← ESTMEAN(β, ε, Hˆ2, k1,L1)
10: Analyst computes I ← [µˆ1 ± σˆ(2 +√ln(4n))]
11: for user i ∈ U2 do
12: User i outputs y˜i ← UVRR2(ε, i, I)
13: end for ⊳ End of round 2
14: Analyst outputs µˆ2 ← 2n ∑i∈U2 y˜i
Output: Analyst estimate µˆ2 of µ
4.1.1 First round of UVGAUSSTIMATE
Similarly to KVGAUSSTIMATE, we split U1 into L1 = ⌊n/(2k1)⌋ subgroups of size k1 =
Ω( log(n/β)
ε2
) and define Lmin = ⌊log(σmin)⌋, Lmax = L1 + Lmin − 1 ≥ ⌈log(σmax)⌉, andL1 = {Lmin, Lmin + 1, . . . , Lmax}, indexing U1 by L1.
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Also as in KVGAUSSTIMATE, each user i in each subgroup U j1 publishes a privatized version
of ⌊xi/2j⌋ mod 4. The analyst aggregates them (KVAGG1) into Hˆ2 and roughly estimates µ
(ESTMEAN) as in KVGAUSSTIMATE. However, the analyst also employs a (similar) aggregation
(AGG1) into Hˆ1 for estimating σ (ESTVAR). At a high level, because samples fromN(µ,σ2) prob-
ably fall within 3σ of µ, when 2j ≫ σ there exist a, a + 1 mod 4 ∈ {0,1,2,3} such that almost
all users i have ⌊xi/2j⌋ mod 4 ∈ {a, a + 1}. The analyst’s debiased aggregated histogram Hˆj1 thus
concentrates in at most two adjacent bins when 2j ≫ σ and spreads over more bins when 2j ≪ σ.
By a process like ESTMEAN, examining this transition from concentrated to unconcentrated in
HˆLmax1 , Hˆ
Lmax−1
1 , . . . yields a rough estimate of when 2
j ≫ σ versus when 2j ≪ σ. As a result, at
the end of round one the analyst obtains O(σ)-accurate estimates σˆ of σ and µˆ1 of µ.
4.1.2 Second round of UVGAUSSTIMATE
The analyst now refines their initial estimate of µ. First, the analyst constructs an interval I of size
O(σˆ√log(n)) around µˆ1. Users in U2 then truncate their values to I , add Laplace noise scaled to∣I ∣ (the sensitivity of releasing a truncated point), and send the result to the analyst using UVRR2.
The analyst then simply takes the mean of these responses as the final estimate of µ. Its accuracy
guarantee follows from concentration of user samples around µ and Laplace noise around 0. Privacy
follows from our use of randomized response and Laplace noise.
We briefly explain our use of Laplace noise rather than CDF comparison. Roughly, when using an
estimate σˆ in the centering process, error in σˆ propagates to error in the final estimate µˆ2. This
leads us to Laplace noise, which better handles the error in σˆ that estimation of σ introduces. The
cost is the
√
log(n) factor that arises from adding Laplace noise scaled to ∣I ∣. Our choice of ∣I ∣ —
constructed to contain not only µ but the points of Ω(n) users — thus strikes a deliberate balance.
I is both large enough to cover most users (who would otherwise truncate too much and skew
the responses) and small enough to not introduce much noise from privacy (as noise is scaled to
Lap (∣I ∣/ε)).
4.2 One-round Protocol
We now provide a one-round version of UVGAUSSTIMATE, 1ROUNDUVGAUSSTIMATE.
Theorem 4.2. One-round protocol 1ROUNDUVGAUSSTIMATE satisfies (ε,0)-local differential pri-
vacy for x1, . . . , xn and, if x1, . . . , xn ∼iid N(µ,σ2) where σ is unknown but bounded in known[σmin, σmax] and nlog(n) = Ω( [log( σmaxσmin +1)+log(µ)] log( 1β )ε2 ), with probability at least 1−β outputs µˆ
with
∣µˆ − µ∣ = O⎛⎜⎝σε
√
log(σmax
σmin
+1) log(1/β) log3/2(n)
n
⎞⎟⎠ .
Like 1ROUNDKVGAUSSTIMATE, 1ROUNDUVGAUSSTIMATE simulates the second round of
UVGAUSSTIMATE simultaneously with its first round. 1ROUNDUVGAUSSTIMATE splits U2 into
subgroups, where each subgroup responds using a different interval Ij . At the end of the single
round the analyst obtains estimates µˆ1 and σˆ from users in U1, constructs an interval I from these
estimates, and finds a subgroup of U2 where most users employed a similar interval Ij . This simi-
larity guarantees that the subgroup’s responses yield the same accuracy as the two-round case up to
an O(# subgroups) factor. As in 1ROUNDKVGAUSSTIMATE, we rely on Gaussian concentration
and the modulus trick to minimize the number of subgroups. However, this time we parallelize not
only over possible values of µˆ1 but possible values of σˆ as well. As this parallelization is somewhat
involved, we defer its presentation to the Supplement.
In summary, at the end of the round the analyst computes µˆ1 and σˆ, computes the resulting
interval I∗, and identifies a subgroup of U2 that responded using an interval Ij similar to I∗.
This mimics the effect of passing an interval of size O(σ√log(n)) around µˆ1 to this subgroup
and using the truncate-then-Laplace noise method of UVGAUSSTIMATE. The cost, due to the
g = O ([log (σmax
σmin
) + 1]√log(n)) subgroups required, is the 1/√g reduction in accuracy shown in
Theorem 4.2.
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5 Lower Bound
We now show that all of our upper bounds are tight up to logarithmic factors. Our argument has three
steps: we first reduce our estimation problem to a testing problem, then reduce this testing problem
to a purely locally private testing problem, and finally prove a lower bound for this purely locally
private testing problem. Taken together, these results show that estimation is hard for sequentially
interactive (ε, δ)-locally private protocols. An extension to fully interactive protocols using recent
subsequent work by Joseph et al. [18] appears in the Supplement.
Theorem 5.1. Let δ < min ( ǫβ
60n ln(5n/2β) , β16n ln(n/β)e7ε ) and ε > 0. There exists absolute constant
c such that if A is an (ε, δ)-locally private (α,β)-estimator for Estimate (n,M,σ) where M =
σ/[4(eε − 1)√2nc] and β < 1/16, then α ≥M/2 = Ω(σ
ε
√
1
n
).
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6 Proofs from Section 3.1
We start with pseudocode for RR1.
Algorithm 7 RR1
Input: ε, i, j
1: yi ← ⌊xi/2j⌋ mod 4
2: if p ∼U [0,1] ≤ eεeε+3 then
3: User i publishes y˜i ← yi
4: else
5: User i publishes y˜i ∼u ({0,1,2,3}/{yi})
6: end if
Output: Private user estimate y˜i of µ(j)
Next, we prove the privacy guarantee for KVGAUSSTIMATE.
Theorem 6.1. KVGAUSSTIMATE satisfies (ε,0)-local differential privacy for x1, . . . , xn.
10
Proof. As KVGAUSSTIMATE is sequentially interactive, each user only produces one output. It
therefore suffices to show that each randomized response routine used in KVGAUSSTIMATE is(ε,0)-locally private. In RR1, for any possible inputs x,x′ and output y we have
P [RR1(x) = y]
P [RR1(x′) = y] ≤ eε/(eε + 3)1/(eε + 3) ≤ eε
so RR1 is (ε,0)-locally private. KVRR2 is (ε,0)-locally private by similar logic.
We now prove the accuracy guarantee for KVGAUSSTIMATE. First, recall that Hˆ1 is the aggregation
(via KVAGG1) of user responses (via RR1). Let H1 be the “true” histogram, H
j
1(a) = ∣{yi ∣ i ∈
U
j
1 , yi = a}∣ for all a ∈ {0,1,2,3} and j ∈ L. Since the analyst only has access to Hˆ1, we need to
show that Hˆ1 andH1 are similar.
Lemma 6.2. With probability at least 1 − β, for all j ∈ L,
∣∣Hˆj1 −Hj1 ∣∣∞ ≤ ( ε+4ε√2) ⋅√k ln(8L/β).
Proof. Choose a ∈ {0,1,2,3} and j ∈ L. E [Cj(a)] = Hj1(a)eε
eε+3 + k−H
j
1
(a)
eε+3 = H
j
1
(a)(eε−1)+k
eε+3 , so by a
pair of Chernoff bounds on the k users in U j1 , with probability at least 1 − β/4L,∣Cj(a) − Hj1(a)(eε−1)+k
eε+3 ∣ ≤√k ln(8L/β)/2.
Then since Hˆj1(a) = eε+3eε−1 ⋅ (Cj(a) − keε+3), this implies
∣Hˆj1(a) −Hj1(a)∣ ≤ eε + 3eε − 1 ⋅√k ln(8L/β)/2 < ( ε+4ε√2) ⋅√k ln(8L/β)
where the last step uses e
ε+3
eε−1 < ε+4ε . Union bounding over a ∈ {0,1,2,3} and all L groups U j1
completes the proof.
Next, we show how the analyst uses Hˆ1 to estimate µ through ESTMEAN. Intuitively, in subgroup
U
j
1 when user responses concentrate in a single bin mod 4, this suggests that µ lies in the corre-
sponding bin. In the other direction, when user responses do not concentrate in a single bin, users
with points near µ must spread out over multiple bins, suggesting that µ lies near the boundary
between bins. We formalize this intuition in ESTMEAN and Lemma 6.3.
Lemma 6.3. Conditioned on the success of the preceding lemmas, with probability at least 1 − β,∣µˆ1 − µ∣ ≤ 2σ.
Proof. Recall the definitions of ψ, M1(j), and M2(j) from the pseudocode for EST-
MEAN: ψ = ( ε+4
ε
√
2
) ⋅ √k ln(8L/β), M1(j) = argmaxa∈{0,1,2,3} Hˆj1(a), and M2(j) =
argmaxa∈{0,1,2,3}−{M1(j)} Hˆj1(a). We start by proving two useful claims.
Claim 1: With probability at least 1−β/5, for all j ∈ Lwhere 2j > σ, if j′ = Lmax, Lmax−1, . . . , j+1
all have Hˆj
′
1 (M1(j)) ≥ 0.52k + ψ, then µ ∈ Ij .
To see why, suppose 2j > σ and let x ∼ N(µ,σ2). Recall the Gaussian CDF F (x) =
1
2
[1 + erf( x−µ
σ
√
2
)]. Then for any a /≡ ⌊µ/2j⌋ mod 4
P [⌊x/2j⌋ ≡ a mod 4] ≤ P [x /∈ [µ,µ + 3 ⋅ 2j)] < P [x /∈ [µ,µ + 3σ)] < 0.51
where the second inequality uses 2j > σ. Thus by a binomial Chernoff bound, the assumption
k > 5000 ln(5L/β), and Lemma 6.2, with probability ≥ 1 − β/5L, Hˆj1(a) < 0.52k +ψ. Therefore if
for some a we have Hˆj1(a) ≥ 0.52k +ψ, a ≡ ⌊µ/2j⌋ mod 4. Moreover, if µ ∈ Ij then letting c be the
(unique) integer such that c ≡M1(j) mod 4 and c2j ∈ Ij (since Ij has endpoints c12j and (c1+2)2j
for integer c1) we get µ ∈ [c2j , (c+ 1)2j] = Ij . As µ ∈ ILmax by our assumed lower bound on n, the
claim follows by induction.
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Claim 2: Let j be the maximum j ∈ L with Hˆj1(M1(j)) < 0.52k + ψ, and let c∗ be the maximum
integer such that c∗2j ∈ Ij and c∗ ≡M1(j) orM2(j) mod 4. If 2j > σ, then with probability at least
1 − 4β/5, ∣c∗2j − µ∣ ≤ 2σ.
To see why, first note that by Claim 1, µ ∈ Ij . Let [c2j , (c+1)2j) be the subinterval of Ij containing
µ for integer c. Then as 2j > σ, for x ∼ N(µ,σ2), by another application of the Gaussian CDF,
P [x ∈ [c2j, (c + 1)2j)] > P [x ∈ [µ,µ + σ)] ≥ 0.34.
Thus by the same method as above, using the assumption k > 5000 ln(5/β), with probability at least
1 − β/5, Hˆj1(c mod 4) ≥ 0.33k −ψ. By similar logic, since
P [⌊x/2j⌋ ≡ c + 2 mod 4] < max
λ∈[0,2j ]P [x /∈ [µ − 2j − λ,µ + 2 ⋅ 2j − λ]] < P [x /∈ [µ − σ,µ + 2σ)] ≤ 0.19
with probability at least 1 − β/5, Hˆj1(c + 2 mod 4) ≤ 0.2k + ψ. Next, consider Hˆj1(c − 1 mod 4). If
µ ≥ (c + 0.75)2j, then
P [x ∈ [(c − 1)2j, c2j)] ≤ P [x /∈ [µ − 3σ/4, µ + 9σ/4]] ≤ 0.24
so with probability at least 1 − β/5
Hˆ
j
1(c − 1 mod 4) ≤ 0.25k +ψ < 0.33k −ψ ≤ Hˆj1(c mod 4)
where the middle inequality uses k > 625 ( ε+4
ε
√
2
)2 ln(4L/β). Thus c ≡M1(j) orM2(j) mod 4; the
µ ≤ (c+0.25)2j) case is symmetric. If instead µ ∈ ((c+0.25)2j, (c+0.75)2j) then by similar logic
with probability at least 1 − β/5
Hˆ
j
1(c mod 4) ≥ 0.36k − ψ.
so by ψ < 0.08k (implied by k > 40 ( ε+4
ε
√
2
)2 ln(8L/β)) c ≡M1(j) orM2(j) mod 4. It follows that
with probability at least 1 − 3β/5 in all cases c ≡ M1(j) or M2(j) mod 4. Moreover, by a similar
application of the Gaussian CDF, one of c − 1 mod 4 and c + 1 mod 4 lies in {M1(j),M2(j)} as
well.
Recalling that c∗ is the maximum integer such that c∗2j ∈ Ij and c∗ ≡ M1(j) or M2(j) mod 4,
c∗ − 1 mod 4 ∈ {M1(j),M2(j)} as well. Assume ∣c∗2j −µ∣ > 2σ. By above, µ ∈ [c∗2j, (c∗ + 1)2j)
or [(c∗ − 1)2j, (c∗2j)). In the first case,
P [⌊x/2j⌋ ≡ c∗ − 1 mod 4] ≤ P [x /∈ [µ − 2σ,µ + 2σ]] ≤ 0.05
so with probability at least 1 − β/5, Hˆj1(c∗ − 1) ≤ 0.06k + ψ, a contradiction of c∗ − 1 mod 4 ∈{M1(j),M2(j)}. In the second case,
P [⌊x/2j⌋ ≡ c∗ mod 4] ≤ P [x /∈ [µ − 2σ,µ + 2σ]] ≤ 0.05
and with probability at least 1−β/5, Hˆj1(c∗) ≤ 0.06k+ψ, contradicting c∗ mod 4 ∈ {M1(j),M2(j)}.
Thus ∣c∗2j − µ∣ ≤ 2σ.
We put these facts together in ESTMEAN as follows: let j1 be the maximum element of L such that
Hˆ
j
1(M1(j)) < 0.52k − ψ. If 2j1 > σ, then by Fact 2 setting µˆ1 = c∗2j implies ∣µˆ1 − µ∣ ≤ 2σ. If
instead 2j1 ≤ σ, then any setting of µˆ1 ∈ Ij (including µˆ1 = c∗2j) guarantees ∣µˆ1 − µ∣ ≤ 2j1+1 ≤ 2σ.
Thus in all cases, with probability at least 1 − β, ∣µˆ1 − µ∣ ≤ 2σ.
The results above give the analyst an (initial) estimate µˆ1 such that ∣µˆ1 − µ∣ ≤ 2σ. This concludes
our analysis of round one of KVGAUSSTIMATE. Now, the analyst passes this estimate µˆ1 to users
i ∈ U2, and each user uses µˆ1 to center their value xi and randomized respond on the resulting(xi − µˆ1)/σ in KVRR2. The analyst then aggregates these results using KVAGG2. We now prove
that this centering process results in a more accurate final estimate µˆ2 of µ.
Lemma 6.4. Conditioned on the success of the previous lemmas, with probability at least 1 − β
KVGAUSSTIMATE outputs µˆ2 such that
∣µˆ2 − µ∣ = O⎛⎝σε
√
log(1/β)
n
⎞⎠ .
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Proof. The proof is broadly similar to that of Theorem B.1 in Braverman et al. [6], with some
modifications for privacy. First, by Lemma 6.3 µ − µˆ1 ∈ [−2σ,2σ]. Letting µ¯ = (µ − µˆ1)/σ we get
that x′i ∼ N(µ¯,1). Next, since E [yi] = 2P [x′i ≥ 0] − 1, and in general
Φµ,σ2(x) = 1
2
(1 + erf(x − µ
σ
√
2
))
where Φµ,σ2 is the CDF of N(µ,σ2), by Φµ¯,1(0) = P [x′i ≥ 0] we get E [yi] = erf(µ¯/√2) (note
that we are analyzing the unprivatized values yi to start; later, we will use this analysis to prove the
analogous result for the privatized values y˜i).
A Chernoff bound on [−1,1]-bounded random variables then shows that, with probability at least
1 − β/2, for y = 2
n ∑i∈U2 yi we have∣y − erf(µ¯/√2)∣ ≤ 2√ln(4/β)/n
and by E [y] = erf(µ¯/√2) we get ∣y −E [y] ∣ ≤ 2√ln(4/β)/n as well.
Since µ − µˆ1 ∈ [−2σ,2σ], ∣erf(µ¯/√2)∣ ≤ erf(√2). Thus ∣E [y] ∣ ≤ erf(√2), so by ∣y − E [y] ∣ ≤
2
√
ln(4/β)/n we get ∣y∣ ≤ erf(√2) + 2√ln(4/β)/n.
Using n > 20000 ln(4/β) we get 2√ln(4/β)/n < 0.01 and erf(√2) < 0.96, so ∣y∣ ≤ 0.97 and thus∣y∣ < erf(1.6). LetM be an upper bound on the Lipschitz constant for erf−1 in [−0.97,0.97],
M = max
x∈[−0.97,0.97]
derf−1(x)
dx
= max
x∈[−0.97,0.97]
√
π
2
exp([erf−1(x)]2)
≤
√
π
2
exp([erf−1(0.97)]2) < 10.
Then for any x, y ∈ [−0.97,0.97] we have ∣erf−1(x) − erf−1(y)∣ ≤ M ∣x − y∣, so setting T =√
2erf−1(y), ∣T − µ¯∣ = ∣√2(erf−1(y) − erf−1(E [y])∣ ≤ 10√2∣y − E [y] ∣
≤ 20√2 ln(4/β)/n
using the bound on ∣y − E [y] ∣ from above.
It remains to analyze the privatized values {y˜i} and bound ∣T − Tˆ ∣, recalling that we set
Tˆ =√2 ⋅ erf−1 (2(−Hˆ2(−1) + Hˆ2(1))
n
)
in KVAGG1. By a Chernoff bound analogous to that of Lemma 6.2, with probability at least 1−β/2
∣T − Tˆ ∣ ≤√2 RRRRRRRRRRRRerf−1(∣y∣) − erf−1
⎛⎝∣y∣ + [ε + 2ε ]
√
2 ln(4/β)
n
⎞⎠
RRRRRRRRRRRR .
Using n > 20000 (ε+2
ε
)2 ln(4/β) (which implies [ ε+2
ε
]√2 ln(4/β)
n
≤ 0.01) and the same derivative
trick as above on [−0.98,0.98], we get
∣T − Tˆ ∣ ≤ 14 [ε + 2
ε
]√2 ln(4/β)
n
.
Therefore by the triangle inequality
∣Tˆ − µ¯∣ ≤ (20 + 14 [ε + 2
ε
])√2 ln(4/β)
n
13
and by σµ¯ = µ − µˆ1 we get
∣σTˆ − σµ¯∣ = ∣(σTˆ + µˆ1) − µ∣ ≤ σ (20 + 14 [ε + 2
ε
])√2 ln(4/β)
n
.
Thus by taking µˆ2 = σTˆ + µˆ1, we get
∣µˆ2 − µ∣ = O⎛⎝σε
√
log(1/β)
n
⎞⎠ .
7 Proofs from Section 3.2
We start with full pseudocode for 1ROUNDKVGAUSSTIMATE.
Algorithm 8 1ROUNDKVGAUSSTIMATE
Input: ε, k1, k2,L, n,R,S,σ,U1 , U2
1: for j ∈ L do
2: for user i ∈ U j1 do
3: User i outputs y˜i ← RR1(ε, i, j)
4: end for
5: end for
6: for j ∈ R do
7: for user i ∈ U j2 do
8: User i outputs y˜i ← 1ROUNDKVRR2(ε, i, S(j))
9: end for
10: end for ⊳ End of round 1
11: Analyst computes Hˆ1 ← KVAGG1(ε, k1,L, U1)
12: Analyst computes µˆ1 ← ESTMEAN(β, ε, Hˆ1, k1,L, )
13: Analyst computes j∗ ← argminj∈Rmins∈S(j) ∣s − µˆ1∣
14: Analyst computes Hˆ2 ← KVAGG2(ε, k2, U j∗2 )
15: Analyst computes Tˆ ←√2 ⋅ erf−1 (−Hˆ2(−1)+Hˆ2(1)
k2
)
16: Analyst outputs µˆ2 ← σTˆ + argmins∈S(j∗) ∣s − µˆ1∣
Output: Analyst estimate µˆ2 of µ
1ROUNDKVGAUSSTIMATE’s privacy guarantee follows from the same analysis of randomized re-
sponse as in KVGAUSSTIMATE, so we state the guarantee but omit its proof.
Theorem 7.1. 1ROUNDKVGAUSSTIMATE satisfies (ε,0)-local differentially privacy for
x1, . . . , xn.
We define k (here denoted k1), L, U1, and U2 as in KVGAUSSTIMATE. As 1ROUNDKVGAUSSTI-
MATE’s treatment of users in U1 is identical to that of KVGAUSSTIMATE, we skip its analysis,
instead recalling its final guarantee:
Lemma 7.2. With probability at least 1 − β, ∣µˆ1 − µ∣ ≤ 2σ.
This brings us to U2, and we define new parameters as follows. For neatness, let ρ = ⌈2√ln(4n)⌉ ≥⌈√2 ln(2√n) + 2.1⌉ for n ≥ 32. We set R = {0.2σ,0.4σ, . . . , ρσ} and split U2 into ∣R∣ = 5ρ groups
indexed by j ∈ R, each of size k2 ≥ ⌊n/2∣R∣⌋ ≥ ⌊ n
20
√
ln(4n)⌋ = Ω(n/√log(n)), where the last
inequality uses n ≥ 25. Finally, for each j ∈ R we define S(j) = {j + bρσ ∣ b ∈ Z}.
With this setup, for each j ∈ R each user i ∈ U j2 uses 1ROUNDKVRR2 to execute a group-specific
version of KVRR2: rather than centering by µˆ1 as in KVRR2, user i now centers by the nearest
point in S(j) (breaking ties arbitrarily).
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Algorithm 9 1ROUNDKVRR2
Input: ε, i, S(j)
1: User i computes zi ← argminzi∈S(j) ∣zi − xi∣
2: User i computes yi ← sgn((xi − zi)/σ)
3: User i computes c ∼U [0,1]
4: if c ≤ eε
eε+1 then
5: User i publishes y˜i ← yi
6: else
7: User i publishes y˜i ← −yi
8: end if
Output: Private centered user estimate y˜i
To analyze 1ROUNDKVRR2, we first prove that users in each group draw points concentrated
around µ.
Lemma 7.3. With probability at least 1 − β, for all j ∈ R, group U j2 contains ≤ 2
√
k2 users i such
that ∣xi − µ∣ > σ√ln(4n).
Proof. First, by a Gaussian tail bound, for each user i, P [∣xi − µ∣ ≥ σ√ln(4n)] ≤ 1/√n. Let U jC
denote the users in group U j2 such that ∣xi − µ∣ > σ√ln(4n). Then by a binomial Chernoff bound
P
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣∣U c∣ > k2√n +
¿ÁÁÀ3k2 ln(∣R∣/β)√
n
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ ≤ β/∣R∣
so using n ≥ 9 ln(∣R∣/β)2 and union bounding over ∣R∣ = Ω(√log(n)) groups, the claim follows.
In particular, this implies that for j∗ = argminj∗∈Rmins∈S(j∗) ∣s − µˆ1∣ (i.e., the group with element
of S(j∗) closest to µˆ1), most users draw points in [µ − σ√ln(4n), µ + σ√ln(4n)]. Let s∗ =
mins∈S(j∗) ∣s − µˆ1∣. Our final accuracy result will rely on two facts. First, most users in U j∗2 center
using s∗. Second, the randomized responses of users who center with s∗ are “almost as good” as if
they were centered by µ.
Lemma 7.4. Conditioned on the success of the previous lemmas, with probability at least 1 − β,
1ROUNDKVGAUSSTIMATE outputs µˆ2 such that
∣µˆ2 − µ∣ = O⎛⎜⎝σε
¿ÁÁÀ log(1/β)√log(n)
n
⎞⎟⎠ .
Proof. Because adjacent points in R are 0.2σ apart, ∣s∗ − µˆ1∣ ≤ 0.1σ. Lemma 7.2 and the triangle
inequality then imply that ∣s∗ − µ∣ ≤ 2.1σ. This enables us to mimic the proof of Lemma 6.4,
replacing µ − µˆ1 ∈ [−2σ,2σ] with µ − s∗ ∈ [−2.1σ,2.1σ].
We can decompose users in U j
∗
2 into those with points within σρ of s
∗ and those with more distant
points. Denote the first set of users by V and the second set by V c, and recall that the Gaussian CDF
is
Φµ,σ2(x) = 1
2
(1 + erf(x − µ
σ
√
2
)) .
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Then, letting 1 denote the indicator function,
E [yi ⋅ 1(i ∈ V )] = P [yi = 1, i ∈ V ] − P [yi = −1, i ∈ V ]
= Φµ,σ2(s∗ + σρ) +Φµ,σ2(s∗ − σρ) − 2Φµ,σ2(s∗)
= 1
2
[erf(s∗ + σρ − µ
σ
√
2
) + erf(s∗ − σρ − µ
σ
√
2
)] − erf(s∗ − µ
σ
√
2
)
= 1
2
[erf(σρ + s∗ − µ
σ
√
2
) − erf(σρ − (s∗ − µ)
σ
√
2
)] − erf(s∗ − µ
σ
√
2
) .
where the last step uses the fact that erf is an odd function. Since erf(x) = 2√
π ∫ x0 e−t2dt and∣s∗ − µ∣ ≤ 2.1σ,
1
2
[erf(σρ + s∗ − µ
σ
√
2
) − erf(σρ − (s∗ − µ)
σ
√
2
)] ≤ 1√
π
∫
(σρ+2.1σ)/σ√2
(σρ−2.1σ)/σ√2 e
−t2dt
< 3e−[(ρ−2.1)/
√
2]2
≤ 3e− ln(4n)/2
where the second inequality relies on e−x being monotone decreasing and the last step uses n > 20,
which implies ρ − 2.1 ≥√ln(4n). Then using n ≥ 3k2 we get 3e− ln(4n)/2 ≤ 1√k2 , so
∣E [yi ⋅ 1(i ∈ V )] − erf(µ − s∗
σ
√
2
)∣ ≤ 1√
k2
. (1)
Next, as ∣s∗ − µ∣ ≤ 2.1σ, users having points within σ√2 ln(2√n) of µ have points within σρ
of s∗. The Gaussian tail bound from Lemma 7.3 then implies P [x ∈ V c] ≤ 1/√n. E [yi] =
E [yi ⋅ 1(i ∈ V )] + E [yi ⋅ 1(i ∈ V c)], and by the above bound on P [x ∈ V c] and ∣yi∣ ≤ 1 we get∣E [yi ⋅ 1(i ∈ V c)] ∣ ≤ 1/√n. Thus
∣E [yi ⋅ 1(i ∈ V )] −E [yi]∣ ≤ 1√
n
< 1√
k2
. (2)
A Chernoff bound on {−1,1}-valued random variables then tells us that, for y = 1
k2
∑
i∈Uj∗
2
yi, with
probability at least 1 − β/2 we have
∣y −E [yi]∣ ≤√2 ln(4/β)
k2
. (3)
Combining the three numbered equations above with the triangle inequality yields
∣y − erf(µ − s∗
σ
√
2
)∣ < 2 +√2 ln(4/β)√
k2
.
Setting µ¯ = (µ − s∗)/σ and using k2 ≥ (100[2 + √2 ln(4/β))])2, this rearranges into ∣y∣ ≤
erf(µ¯/√2) + 0.01. Since µ¯ ∈ [−2.1,2.1], we get
∣y∣ < erf(2.1/√2) + 0.01 < 0.98 < erf(1.7).
LetM be an upper bound on the Lipschitz constant for erf−1 in [−0.98,0.98],
M = max
x∈[−0.98,0.98]
derf−1(x)
dx
= max
x∈[−0.98,0.98]
√
π
2
exp([erf−1(x)]2)
≤
√
π
2
exp([erf−1(0.98)]2) < 14.
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Then for any x, y ∈ [−0.98,0.98] we have ∣erf−1(x) − erf−1(y)∣ ≤M ∣x − y∣, so for T =√2erf−1(y),∣T − µ¯∣ = ∣√2(erf−1(y) − erf−1(erf(µ¯/√2))∣ ≤ 14√2∣y − erf(µ¯/√2)∣
< 28⎛⎝
√
2 +√ln(4/β)
k2
⎞⎠ .
It remains to bound ∣T − Tˆ ∣, where T is the (unknown) aggregation of unprivatized {yi} while Tˆ is
the (known) aggregation of privatized {y˜i}. By a Chernoff bound analogous to that of Lemma 6.2,
with probability at least 1 − β/2
∣T − Tˆ ∣ ≤√2 RRRRRRRRRRRerf−1(∣y∣) − erf−1 ⎛⎝∣y∣ + [ε + 2ε ]
√
2 ln(4/β)
k2
⎞⎠RRRRRRRRRRR .
Using k2 > 20000 (ε+2ε )2 ln(4/β) (which implies [ ε+2ε ]√2 ln(4/β)k2 ≤ 0.01) and the same derivative
trick as above on [−0.99,0.99], we get
∣T − Tˆ ∣ ≤ 25 [ε + 2
ε
]√2 ln(4/β)
k2
.
Therefore by the triangle inequality
∣Tˆ − µ¯∣ ≤ 28⎛⎝
√
2 +√ln(4/β)
k2
⎞⎠ + 25 [ε + 2ε ]
√
2 ln(4/β)
k2
= O⎛⎝1ε
√
log(1/β)
k2
⎞⎠
and by σµ¯ = µ − s∗ we get
∣σTˆ − σµ¯∣ = ∣(σTˆ + s∗) − µ∣ = O⎛⎝σε
√
log(1/β)
k2
⎞⎠ .
Thus by taking µˆ2 = σTˆ + s∗ and substituting in k2 = Ω(n/√log(n)) we get
∣µˆ2 − µ∣ = O⎛⎜⎝σε
¿ÁÁÀ log(1/β)√log(n)
n
⎞⎟⎠ .
8 Proofs from Section 4.1
We begin our analysis with a privacy guarantee.
Theorem 8.1. UVGAUSSTIMATE satisfies (ε,0)-local differentially privacy for x1, . . . , xn.
Proof. As we already proved that RR1 is private in Section 6, we are left with UVRR2. To prove
that UVRR2 is (ε,0)-locally differentially private as well, we can use a standard Laplace noise
privacy guarantee (see e.g. Theorem 3.6 from Dwork and Roth [15]): given function f with 1-
sensitivity∆f , computing f(x) + Lap (∆f/ε) satisfies (ε,0)-differential privacy.
First, for each j ∈ L1 and i ∈ U j1 , user i employs RR1 (see Section 6) to publish a privatized version
of ⌊x/2j⌋ mod 4. The analyst then constructs two slightly different aggregations of this data. To
estimate σ, the analyst aggregates responses into Hˆ1 via AGG1, which is similar to KVAGG1 up
to the choice of bins in the constructed histogram Hˆ1. Specifically, bins in Hˆ1 are grouped: points
with value 0 count toward both bin (0,1) and bin (3,0), points with value 1 count toward both bin(0,1) and (1,2), and so on.
At a high level, when 2j ≫ σ, user responses in group U j1 appear concentrated in one element of{(0,1), (1,2), (2,3), (3,0)}. This is because user data comes from N(µ,σ2), so if 2j ≫ σ then
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Algorithm 10 AGG1
Input: ε, k,L, U
1: for j ∈ L do
2: for a = 0,1,2,3 do
3: Analyst computes Cj(a) ← ∣{i ∣ i ∈ U j, y˜i = a}∣
4: Analyst computes Hˆj(a)← eε+3
eε−1 ⋅ (Cj(a) − keε+3)
5: end for
6: for a = 0,1,2,3 do
7: Analyst computes Hˆj1(a)← Hˆj(a) + Hˆj(a + 1 mod 4)
8: end for
9: end for
10: Analyst outputs Hˆ1
Output: Analyst aggregation Hˆ1 of private user estimates
most user data falls within 3σ of µ. Consequently, there exists a ∈ {0,1,2,3} such that most users
draw points x where ⌊x/2j⌋ ≡ a or a+1 mod 4, and Hˆj1 is concentrated around bin (a, a+1 mod 4).
Similarly, if 2j ≪ σ then user responses in group U j1 appear unconcentrated (for a more precise
definition of “concentrated”, see below).
Examining this transition from concentrated to unconcentrated responses in HˆLmax1 , Hˆ
Lmax−1
1 , . . .
yields a rough estimate of when 2j ≫ σ versus when 2j ≪ σ. By approximating when this change
occurs, the analyst recovers an approximation of σ. This process is outlined in ESTVAR.
Algorithm 11 ESTVAR
Input: β, ε, Hˆ1, k1,L1
1: Analyst computes j ← minimum j such that, for all j′ ≥ j, Hˆj′1 is concentrated
2: if j = ∅ then
3: Analyst outputs σˆ ← 2Lmax
4: else
5: Analyst outputs σˆ ← 2j
6: end if
Output: Analyst estimate σˆ of σ
Hˆ1 is an estimate of the “true” histogram collection, Hj(a) = ∣{yi ∣ i ∈ U j1 , yi ∈ {a, a + 1 mod 4}}∣
for all j ∈ L1. As in Lemma 6.2, we can show that Hˆ1 and H1 are similar. As the proof is nearly
identical, we omit it.
Lemma 8.2. With probability at least 1 − β, for all j ∈ L1,∣∣Hˆj1 −Hj1 ∣∣∞ ≤ (1 + 4ε)√2k1 ln(8L1/β).
Next, we show how the analyst uses Hˆ1 to estimate σ in subroutine ESTVAR. Here, for neatness we
shorthand
τ =√2k1 ln(2L1/β) + (1 + 4ε)√2k1 ln(8L1/β)
and use the term concentrated to denote any histogram Hˆj1 such thatmina∈{0,1,2,3} Hˆj1(a) ≤ 0.03k+
τ and the term unconcentrated to denote Hˆj1 where mina∈{0,1,2,3} Hˆj1(a) ≥ 0.04k − τ . As we
show below in Lemma 8.3, when 2j ≫ σ, Hˆj1 is concentrated. Similarly, when 2j ≪ σ, Hˆj1 is
unconcentrated. This transition enables the analyst to estimate σ.
Lemma 8.3. Conditioned on the success of the preceding lemmas, with probability at least 1 − β,
ESTVAR outputs σˆ ∈ [σ,8σ].
Proof. Choose j ∈ L1. Below, we reason about two (non-exhaustive) possibilities for j.
Case 1: 2j ≥ 4σ. Then there exists a ∈ {0,1,2,3} and interval I of length 2j+1 ≥ 8σ containing[µ − 2σ,µ + 2σ] such that for all x ∈ I , ⌊x/2j⌋ mod 4 ≡ a or a + 1 mod 4. By similar application of
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the Gaussian CDF as in Lemma 6.3, with probability at least 1 − β/2L1,∣{xi ∣ xi ∈ I, i ∈ U j1}∣ ≥ 0.97k1 −√2k1 ln(2L1/β).
Thus by Lemma 8.2, Hˆj1(a) ≥ 0.97k1 − τ . It follows that Hˆj1(a + 2) ≤ 0.03k1 + τ . 2j ≥ 4σ thus
implies that histogram Hˆj1 is concentrated.
Case 2: 2j ∈ [σ/2, σ]. Choose a ∈ {0,1,2,3}. Since 2j ∈ [σ/2, σ] there exist at most three
subintervals I1, I2, I3 ⊂ [µ − 2σ,µ + 2σ] such that for all x ∈ I = I1 ∪ I2 ∪ I3, ⌊x/2j⌋ ≡ a mod 4,
and ∣I ∣ ≥ σ. Let x ∼N(µ,σ2). Then by a similar application of the Gaussian CDF as in Lemma 6.3,
since
P [x ∈ I] ≥ P [x ∈ [µ − 2σ,µ − σ)] ≥ 0.13
with probability 1 − β/8L1 at least 0.13k −√2k1 ln(8L1/β) users from U j1 have points in I . Since
this held for arbitrary a, a union bound over all four possibilities of a combined with Lemma 8.2
implies that, with probability at least 1 − β/2L1,
min
a∈{0,1,2,3} Hˆ
j
1(a) ≥ 0.13k1 − τ.
2j ≤ σ ≤ 2j+1 thus implies that histogram Hˆj1 is uniform.
Union bounding both results over j ∈ L1, with k1 > 800 (2 + 4ε)2 ln(8L1/β), with probability 1 − β
we have 0.13k − τ > 0.03k + τ for each j ∈ L1. Therefore for all j ∈ L1 if 2j ≥ 4σ then Hˆj1 will be
concentrated while if 2j+1 ≥ σ ≥ 2j then Hˆj1 will be unconcentrated.
Let j be the smallest j ∈ L1 such that Hˆj1 is concentrated and for all j′ > j, Hˆj′1 is concentrated as
well. If no such j exists, then we know 2Lmax ≥ σ ≥ 2Lmax−2, take σˆ = 2Lmax , and we get σˆ ∈ [σ,4σ].
If not, then by Case 1 above we know 2j ≤ 8σ, and by Case 2 we know 2j ≥ σ. Thus taking σˆ = 2j ,
we get σˆ ∈ [σ,8σ].
Next, the analyst uses randomized responses from U1 to compute an initial estimate µˆ1 of µ. As the
process ESTMEAN is identical to that used in KVGAUSSTIMATE up to a different subgroup rangeL1, we skip its description and only recall its guarantee:
Lemma 8.4. Conditioned on the success of the preceding lemmas, with probability at least 1 − β,∣µˆ1 − µ∣ ≤ 2σ.
From the results above, the analyst obtains an estimate σˆ such that σˆ ∈ [σ,8σ] and an estimate
µˆ1 such that ∣µˆ1 − µ∣ ≤ 2σ. The analyst now uses these to compute interval I = [µˆ1 − σˆ(2 +√
ln(4n)), µˆ1 + σˆ(2 +√ln(4n))], where I is intentionally constructed to (with high probability)
contain the points of Ω(n) users. The analyst then passes I to users in U2. Users in U2 respond with
noisy responses via independent calls to UVRR2. In UVRR2, each user clips their sample xi to
the interval I and reports a private version y˜i using Laplace noise scaled to ∣I ∣.
Algorithm 12 UVRR2
Input: ε, i, I
1: User i computes x′i ← argminx∈I ∣x − xi∣
2: User i outputs y˜i ← x′i + Lap (∣I ∣/ε)
Output: Private version of user’s point clipped to I
The average of these y˜i then approximates µ. We formalize this in the following lemma, which
proves our main result.
Lemma 8.5. Conditioned on the success of the previous lemmas, with probability at least 1 − β,∣µˆ2 − µ∣ = O (σε√ log(1/β) log(n)n ).
Proof. There are two sources of error in the analyst’s estimate µˆ2 = 2n ∑i y˜i: error from the unnoised
x′is and error from noise in y˜is. Specifically, recalling that ∣U2∣ = n/2, we can decompose µˆ2 as
µˆ2 = 2
n
∑
i
y˜i = 2
n
∑
i
(x′i + ηi)
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where each ηi ∼i.i.d. Lap (∣I ∣/ε) and ∣I ∣ = 2σˆ(2 +√ln(4n)).
First, using n > 4 ln(3/β) by concentration of independent Laplace random variables (see e.g.
Lemma 2.8 in Chan et al. [8]) with probability at least 1 − β/3,
∣ 2
n
∑
i
ηi∣ ≤ 4∣I ∣
ε
√
2 ln(3/β)
n
≤ 8σˆ(2 +√ln(4n))
ε
√
2 ln(3/β)
n
= O⎛⎝ σˆε
√
log(1/β) log(n)
n
⎞⎠ .
This bounds the contribution of Laplace noise to overall error.
It remains to bound ∣ 2
n ∑i x′i −µ∣. Let V denote the set of users with xi ∈ I and V c denote the set of
users with xi /∈ I . First, by a Gaussian tail bound, for each user i, P [∣xi − µ∣ ≥ σ√ln(4n)] ≤ 1/√n.
Then by a Chernoff bound
P
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣∣V c∣ >
⎛⎝1 +
√
6 ln(3/β)
n3/2
⎞⎠√n
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ ≤ β/3
and using n ≥ (6 ln(2/β))2/3 we get√6 ln(3/β)
n3/2
≤ 1, so with probability at least 1−β/3, ∣V c∣ ≤ 2√n.
Thus
2
n
∑
i∈V c
∣x′i − µ∣ ≤ 2
n
(∣V c∣ ⋅ ∣I ∣) ≤ 6σˆ(2 +√ln(4n))√
n
= O⎛⎝ σˆ
√
log(n)√
n
⎞⎠ .
This bounds the contribution of error from the (unprivatized) data of users in V c. Let V denote the
set of users in U2 with points in I . We bound the error contributed by users in V in a similar way.
Users in V have x′i = xi, so by a Chernoff bound on (shifted) [0, ∣I ∣]-bounded random variables,
with probability at least 1 − β/3
2
n
∑
i∈V c
∣x′i−µ∣ = 2
n
∑
i∈V c
∣xi−µ∣ ≤ ∣I ∣√2 ln(6/β)
n
≤ σˆ(2+√ln(4n))√2 ln(6/β)
n
= O⎛⎝ σˆ
√
log(1/β) log(n)√
n
⎞⎠ .
Putting these three bounds together, we get
∣ 2
n
∑
i
y˜i − µ∣ ≤ 2
n
∑
i
∣x′i + ηi − µ∣
≤ 2
n
∑
i
∣x′i − µ∣ + 2
n
∑
i
∣ηi∣
= 2
n
∑
i∈V
∣x′i − µ∣ + 2
n
∑
i∈V c
∣x′i − µ∣ + 2
n
∑
i
∣ηi∣
= O⎛⎝σε
√
log(n) log(1/β)
n
⎞⎠
where the last step uses σˆ ∈ [σ,8σ] from Lemma 8.3.
9 Proofs from Section 4.2
We start with pseudocode for 1ROUNDUVGAUSSTIMATE.
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Algorithm 13 1ROUNDUVGAUSSTIMATE
Input: ε, k1, k2,L1, n,R,σ,U1, U2,
1: Analyst computes ρ ← ⌈√2 ln(2√n) + 6⌉
2: for j ∈ L1 do
3: for user i ∈ U j1 do
4: User i outputs y˜i ← RR1(ε, i, j)
5: end for
6: end for
7: for j1 ∈ L1 do
8: for j2 ∈ Rj1 do
9: for user i ∈ U j1,j22 do
10: User i outputs y˜i ← 1ROUNDUVRR2(ε, i, j1, j2, ρ, S)
11: end for
12: end for
13: end for ⊳ End of round 1
14: Analyst computes Hˆ1 ← AGG1(ε, k1,L1, U1)
15: Analyst computes σˆ ← ESTVAR(β, ε, Hˆ1, k1,L)
16: Analyst computes j1 ← log(σˆ)
17: Analyst computes Hˆ2 ← KVAGG1(ε, k1,L1, U1)
18: Analyst computes µˆ1 ← ESTMEAN(β, ε, Hˆ2, k1,L1)
19: Analyst computes j2 ← argminj∈Rj1 (mins∈S(j1,j) ∣s − µˆ1∣)
20: Analyst computes s∗ ←mins∈S(j1,j2) ∣s − µˆ1∣
21: Analyst outputs µˆ2 ← s∗ + 1k2 ∑i∈Uj1 ,j22 y˜i
Output: Analyst estimate µˆ2 of µ
1ROUNDUVGAUSSTIMATE’s privacy guarantee follows from the same analysis of randomized re-
sponse and Laplace noise as for UVGAUSSTIMATE, so we omit its proof.
Theorem 9.1. 1ROUNDUVGAUSSTIMATE satisfies (ε,0)-local differentially privacy for
x1, . . . , xn.
We define k1,L1, and U1, as in UVGAUSSTIMATE and skip the analysis of 1ROUNDUVGAUSSTI-
MATE’s treatment of users inU1 as it is identical to that of UVGAUSSTIMATE. We recall its collected
guarantee:
Lemma 9.2. With probability at least 1 − β, σˆ ∈ [σ,8σ] and ∣µˆ1 − µ∣ ≤ 2σ.
We again define R and S for U2, albeit with a few modifications. First, we let ρ = ⌈√ln(4n) + 6⌉
for neatness. Then, recalling from Section 8 that L1 ranges over possible values of log(σ), for
each ja ∈ L1 we define Rja = {2ja ,2 ⋅ 2ja , . . . , ρ ⋅ 2ja}. Next, for each ja ∈ L1 and jb ∈ Rja , we
define S(ja, jb) = {jb + bρ2ja ∣ b ∈ Z}. Finally, we split U2 into L1 ⋅ ρ subgroups U ja,jb2 of size
k2 = Ω⎛⎝ nlog(σmax
σmin
+1)√log(n)
⎞⎠ for each ja ∈ L1 and jb ∈ Rja . As in 1ROUNDKVGAUSSTIMATE,
we parallelize over these subgroups to simulate the second round of UVGAUSSTIMATE for different
values of (ja, jb).
In each subgroup U ja,jb2 , each user i computes the nearest element si ∈ S(ja, jb) to xi, si =
argmins∈S(ja,jb) ∣xi−s∣ and outputs xi−si plus Laplace noise in 1ROUNDUVRR2. The analyst then
uses estimates j1 = ⌈log(σˆ)⌉ and µˆ1 from U1 to compute j2 = argminj∈Rj1 (minz∈S(j1,j) ∣z − µˆ1∣).
Finally, the analyst aggregates randomized responses from group U j1,µˆ22 into an estimate µˆ2.
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Algorithm 14 1ROUNDUVRR2
Input: ε, i, j1, j2, ρ, S
1: User i computes si ←mins∈S(j1,j2) ∣s − xi∣
2: User i computes yi ← xi − si
3: User i outputs y˜i ← yi + Lap (2ρ2j1/ε)
Output: Private version of user’s point xi
As in 1ROUNDKVGAUSSTIMATE, we start with a concentration result for each U j1,j22 . Since its
proof is similar to that of Lemma 7.3, we omit it.
Lemma 9.3. With probability at least 1 − β, for all j1 ∈ L1 and j2 ∈ Rj1 , group U j1,j22 contains
≤ 2√k2 users i such that ∣xi − µ∣ > σ√ln(4n).
In combination with the previous lemmas, this enables us to prove our final accuracy result.
Lemma 9.4. Conditioned on the success of the previous lemmas, with probability at least 1 − β,
1ROUNDUVGAUSSTIMATE outputs µˆ2 such that
∣µˆ2 − µ∣ = O⎛⎜⎜⎝σε
¿ÁÁÀ log (σmaxσmin + 1) log(1/β) log3/2(n)
n
⎞⎟⎟⎠ .
Proof. By Lemma 9.2, σˆ ∈ [σ,8σ] and ∣µˆ1 − µ∣ ≤ 2σ. Since j1 = log(σˆ) ∈ L1 and
j2 = argminj∈Rj1 (mins∈S(j1,j) ∣s − µˆ1∣), by the definition of s∗ ∈ S(j1, j2), ∣s∗ − µˆ1∣ ≤ 0.5σˆ < 4σ.
Thus ∣s∗ − µ∣ < 6σ.
Consider group U j1,j22 . By Lemma 9.3 at most 2
√
k2 users i ∈ U j1,j22 have ∣xi − µ∣ > σ√ln(4n).
Thus by ∣s∗ −µ∣ < 6σ and the fact that any two points in S(j1, j2) are at least σˆρ ≥ σ(6+√ln(4n))
far apart, we get that at least k2 − 2√k2 users i ∈ U j1,j22 set si = s∗ in their run of 1ROUNDUVRR2.
Denote this subset of users by V , and denote by V c the set of users i ∈ U j1,j22 such that si ≠ s∗, and
for each user i ∈ U2 let yi = xi − si.
Let f(x) = 1
σ
√
2π
exp(−(x − µ)2/2σ2), the density for N(µ,σ2). Then
∫
∞
∞ (x−µ)f(x)dx = ∫ s∗−ρσˆ−∞ (x−µ)f(x)dx+∫ s∗+ρσˆs∗−ρσˆ (x−µ)f(x)dx+∫ ∞s∗+ρσˆ(x−µ)f(x)dx. (4)
Let g(x) = − σ√
2π
exp(−(x − µ)2/2σ2), the antiderivative of (x − µ)f(x). Then
∣∫ s∗−ρσˆ−∞ (x − µ)f(x)dx∣ = ∣g(s∗ − ρσˆ) − limb→−∞g(b)∣
= ∣ σ√
2π
⋅ exp(−(s∗ − ρσˆ − µ)2
2σ2
)∣
≤ ∣ σ√
2π
⋅ exp(−([6 − ρ]σ)2
2σ2
)∣
≤ ∣ σ√
2π
⋅ exp(− [6 − ρ]2
2
)∣
< σ√
2π
⋅ exp(− ln(2√n))
< σ√
n
where the first inequality uses σˆ ≥ σ and ∣s∗ − µ∣ < 6σ. Similar logic implies∣∫ ∞s∗+ρσˆ(x − µ)f(x)dx∣ ≤ σ/√n as well. Therefore by Equation 4 and ∫ ∞−∞(x − µ)f(x)dx = 0,
∣∫ s∗+ρσˆ
s∗−ρσˆ (x − µ)f(x)dx∣ ≤ 2σ/√n
22
so by E [xi ⋅ 1(i ∈ V )] = ∫ s∗+ρσˆs∗−ρσˆ xf(x)dx, we get
∣E [xi ⋅ 1(i ∈ V )] − µ∫ s∗+ρσˆ
s∗−ρσˆ f(x)dx∣ ≤ 2σ/√n.
Since E [xi ⋅ 1(i ∈ V )] /P [i ∈ V ] = E [xi ∣ i ∈ V ] and P [i ∈ V ] = ∫ s∗+ρσˆs∗−ρσˆ f(x)dx, this means∣E [xi ∣ i ∈ V ] − µ∣ ≤ 2σ/√n.
By yi = xi − s∗ for i ∈ V , ∣E [yi ∣ i ∈ V ] − (µ − s∗)∣ ≤ 2σ/√n.
We can therefore decomposeRRRRRRRRRRRRRR
1
k2
∑
i∈Uj1 ,j2
2
yi − (µ − s∗)RRRRRRRRRRRRRR ≤ ∣
1
k2
∑
i∈V
(yi − (µ − s∗))∣ + ∣ 1
k2
∑
i∈V c
(yi − (µ − s∗))∣
≤
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣ 2σ√n + ρσˆ
√
2 log(4/β)
k2
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ + 2ρσˆ√k2
= O⎛⎝σ
√
log(1/β) log(n)
k2
⎞⎠
where the the first inequality uses a (with probability at least 1−β/2) Chernoff bound on {yi ∣ i ∈ V }
concentrating around E [yi ∣ i ∈ V ] as well as ∣V c∣ ≤ 2√k2, and the last step uses σˆ ∈ [σ,8σ].
Next, since we can decompose
1
k2
∑
i∈Uj1 ,j2
2
y˜i = 1
k2
∑
i∈Uj1,j2
2
yi + 1
k2
∑
i∈Uj1 ,j2
2
ηi
where each ηi ∼ Lap (ρσˆ/ε), the same concentration of Laplace noise from Lemma 8.5 says that
with probability 1 − β/2,
∣ 1
k2
k2
∑
i=1
ηi∣ = O⎛⎝ρσˆε
√
log(1/β)
k2
⎞⎠ = O⎛⎝σε
√
log(1/β) log(n)
k2
⎞⎠ .
Combining with the bound above and substituting in k2 = Ω( n
log( σmax
σmin
+1)√log(n)),RRRRRRRRRRRRRR
1
k2
∑
i∈U
j1,j2
2
y˜i − (µ − s∗)RRRRRRRRRRRRRR = O
⎛⎜⎜⎝σε
¿ÁÁÀ log (σmaxσmin + 1) log(1/β) log3/2(n)
n
⎞⎟⎟⎠ .
The claim then follows from µˆ2 = s∗ + 1k2 ∑i∈Uj1 ,j22 y˜i.
10 Proofs from Section 5
For completeness, we start with the formal notion of sequential interactivity used by Duchi et al.
[13], which requires that the set of messages {Yi} sent by the users satisfies the following conditional
independence structure: {Xi, Y1, . . . , Yi−1} → Yi and Yi ⊥ Xj ∣ {Xi, Y1, . . . , Yi−1} for j ≠ i. Our
notion of sequential interactivity— where each user only sends one message — is a specific case of
this general definition. Our upper bounds all meet this specific requirement, while our lower bound
meets the general one.
We start by defining an instance Estimate (n,M,σ). Here, a protocol receives n samples from a
N(µ,σ2) distribution where σ is known, µ ∈ [0,M], and the goal is to estimate µ. Next, define
uniform random variable V ∼U {0,1}. Consider the following testing problem: for V = v, if v = 0,
then each user i draws a sample xi ∼iid N(0, σ2), while if v = 1 then each user i draws a sample
xi ∼iid N(M,σ2). The problem Test(n,M,σ) is to recover v from x1, . . . , xn. We say protocolA (α,β)-solves Estimate (n,M,σ) if, with probability at least 1 − β, A(Estimate (n,M,σ)) = µˆ
such that ∣µˆ−µ∣ < α. We will say that an algorithmA β-solves Test (n,M,σ) if, with probability at
least 1 − β, A(Test (n,M,σ)) = v. Formally, Test(n,M,σ) is no harder than Estimate (n,M,σ).
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Lemma 10.1. If there exists a sequentially interactive and (ε, δ)-locally private protocol A that(M/2, β)-solves Estimate (n,M,σ), then there exists a sequentially interactive and (ε, δ)-locally
private protocolA′ that β-solves Test(n,M,σ).
Proof. Let x1, . . . , xn be the samples from an instance of Test (n,M,σ). We define A′ to runA(x1, . . . , xn) and then output argminµˆ∈{0,M} ∣A(x1, . . . , xn) − µˆ∣. Since A (M/2, β)-solves
Estimate (n,M,σ), with probability at least 1 − β, ∣A(x1, . . . , xn) − µ∣ < M/2. Thus with proba-
bility at least 1 − β, A′(x1, . . . , xn) = v. Thus A′ β-solves Test(n,M,σ). As A′ interacted with
x1, . . . , xn only through (ε, δ)-locally private A, by preservation of differential privacy under post-
processing, A′ is (ε, δ)-locally private as well. Similar logic implies that A′ is also sequentially
interactive.
We now extend this result to (ε, δ)-locally private protocols using results from both Bun et al. [7]
and Cheu et al. [9]6.
Lemma 10.2. Let δ <min ( ǫβ
48n ln(2n/β) , β16n ln(n/β)e7ε ), ε > 0, and suppose thatA is a sequentially
interactive and (ε, δ)-locally private protocol. If A β-solves Test (n,M,σ), then there exists a
sequentially interactive (10ε,0)-locally private A′ that 4β-solves Test (n,M,σ).
Proof. Our analysis splits into two cases depending on ǫ.
Case 1: ε ≤ 1/4. In this case, we use a result from Bun et al. [7], included here for completeness.
Fact 10.3 (Theorem 6.1 in Bun et al. [7] (restated)). Given ε ≤ 1/4 and δ < ǫβ/48n ln(2n/β),
there exists a (10ε,0)-locally private algorithm A′ such that for every database U = {x1, . . . , xn},
dTV (A(U),A′(U)) ≤ β, where dTV denotes total variation distance.
Thus, denoting byEA the event whereA recovers the correct v on Test(n,M,σ) and EA′ the event
where A′ recovers the correct v on Test (n,M,σ), ∣P [EA] − P [EA′] ∣ ≤ β, where the probabilities
are respectively overA and A′. Thus since A β-solves Test (n,M,σ), it follows that A′ 2β-solves
(and thus also 4β-solves) Test (n,M,σ).
Case 2: ε > 1/4. In this case we use a result from Cheu et al. [9]7
Fact 10.4 (Theorem A.1 in Cheu et al. [9] (restated)). Given ε > 1/4 and δ < β
16n ln(n/β)e7ε , there
exists an (8ε,0)-locally private protocolA′ such that A′ 4β-solves Test (n,M,σ).
Finally, we prove that Test is hard for (ε,0)-locally private protocols. At a high level, we prove
this result by viewing Test as a Markov chain V → data X → outputs Y → answer Z . We bound
the mutual information I(V ;Z) by a function ofM,σ, and I(X ;Y ) using a strong data processing
inequality for Gaussian distributions (see Section 4.1 in Braverman et al. [6] or Raginsky [23] for
details; a primer on information theory appears in the last section). We further bound I(X ;Y ) using
existing tools from the privacy literature [13]. The resulting upper bound on I(V ;Z) enables us to
lower bound the probability of an incorrect answer Z .
Lemma 10.5. SupposeM ≤ σ/[4(eε − 1)√2nc],where c is an absolute constant. For any sequen-
tially interactive and (ε,0)-locally private protocolA that β-solves Test (n,M,σ), β ≥ 1/4.
6Both of these results are stated for noninteractive protocols, it is straightforward to see that their techniques
carry over to sequentially interactive protocols. This is because both results rely on transforming a single user
call to an (ε, δ)-local randomizer into calls to an (O(ε),0)-local randomizer. Since users in sequentially
interactive protocols still only make a single call to a local randomizer, we can apply the same transformations
to each single user call and obtain an (O(ε),0)-locally private sequentially interactive protocol.
7 Cheu et al. [9] originally state their result for ε > 2/3, but mildly strengthening their assumed upper bound
on δ from δ < β
8n ln(n/β)e6ε
to δ < β
16n ln(n/β)e7ε
yields the result here.
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Proof. We may express any sequentially interactive (ε,0)-locally private protocol A that β-solves
Test (n,M,σ) as a Markov chain V → X → Y → Z , where V is the random variable selecting v,
X = (x1, . . . , xn) is the random variable for users’ i.i.d. samples, Y = (y1, . . . , yn) is the random
variable for users’ (ε,0)-privatized responses, and Z = A(Test (n,M,σ)). As V → X → Y → Z
is a Markov chain (i.e., any two random variables in the chain are conditionally independent given
a random variable between them). Thus by a strong data processing inequality for two Gaussians
(see e.g. Section 4.1 in Braverman et al. [6] or, for a broader treatment of strong data processing
inequalities, Raginsky [23]), there exists absolute constant c such that for each user i, I(V ;Yi) ≤
cM2
σ2
I(Xi;Yi), where I(A;B) denotes the mutual information between random variables A and B.
Next, since our protocol is (ε,0)-locally private, by Corollary 1 from Duchi et al. [13], for each user
i, I(Xi;Yi) ≤ 4(eε − 1)2. With the equation above, we get
I(V ;Yi) ≤ 4cM2(eε−1)2σ2 . (5)
Without loss of generality, suppose Z is a deterministic function of Y (if Z is a random function of
Y then it decomposes into a convex combination of deterministic functions of Y ). From Markov
chain V →X → Y → Z and the (generic) data processing inequality we get
I(V ;Z) ≤ I(V ;Y1, . . . , Yn)
=
n
∑
i=1
I(V ;Yi ∣ Yi−1, . . . Y1)
≤
n
∑
i=1
I(V,Yi−1, . . . , Y1;Yi)
=
n
∑
i=1
[I(V ;Yi) + I(Yi−1, . . . , Y1;Yi∣V )]
=
n
∑
i=1
I(V ;Yi)
where the last step follows from the independence of Yi and Y1, . . . , Yi−1 given V . Substituting in
Equation 5, I(V ;Z) ≤ 4ncM2(eε−1)2
σ2
. Therefore byM ≤ σ/4(eε − 1)√2nc we get I(V ;Z) ≤ 1/8.
Define P to be the distribution of Z (over the randomness of V , X , and Y ), and let P0 and P1 be
the distributions for Z ∣V = 0 and Z ∣V = 1 respectively. Then as V is uniform, P = (P0 + P1)/2, so∣∣P − P0∣∣1 = ∣∣P −P1∣∣1 = 12 ∣∣P0 −P1∣∣1.
Moreover, by
P [Z = V ] = P [Z = 0, V = 0] + P [Z = 1, V = 1]
= 1
2
(P0(0) + [1 −P1(0)])
≤ 1
2
(1 + ∣P0(0) −P1(0)∣)
= 1
2
+ 1
4
∣∣P0 −P1∣∣1
we get P [Z = V ] ≤ 1
2
+ 1
4
∣∣P0 −P1∣∣1. Thus∣∣P0 −P1∣∣21
8
= 1
4
(∣∣P0 − P ∣∣21 + ∣∣P1 −P ∣∣21)
≤ 1
2
(DKL(P0∣∣P ) +DKL(P1∣∣P ))
= I(Z;V ) ≤ 1/8
where the second-to-last inequality uses Pinsker’s inequality. It follows that ∣∣P0 −P1∣∣1 ≤ 1. Substi-
tuting this into P [Z = V ] ≤ 1
2
+ 1
4
∣∣P0 − P1∣∣1, we get P [Z = V ] ≤ 34 .
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We combine the preceding results to prove a general lower bound for Estimate as follows: for appro-
priate ε and δ, by Lemma 10.1 any sequentially interactive and ( ε
10
, δ)-locally private protocolA that(M/2, β
4
)-solves Estimate (n,M,σ) implies the existence of a sequentially interactive and ( ε
10
, δ)-
locally private protocol A′ that β
4
-solves Test (n,M,σ). Then, Lemma 10.2 implies the existence
of a sequentially interactive and (ε,0)-locally private protocolA′′ that β-solves Test (n,M,σ). By
Lemma 10.5 any such A′ that β-solves Test(n,M,σ) has β ≥ 1/4. Hardness for Test therefore
implies hardness for Estimate. We condense this reasoning into the following theorem.
Theorem 10.6. Let δ < min ( ǫβ
60n ln(5n/2β) , β16n ln(n/β)e7ε ), ε > 0, and let A be a sequentially inter-
active (ε, δ)-locally private (α,β)-estimator for Estimate (n,M,σ) whereM = σ/[4(eε−1)√2nc],
c is as in Lemma 10.5, and β < 1/16. Then α ≥M/2 = Ω(σ
ε
√
1
n
).
In particular, Theorem 5.1 implies that our upper bounds are tight up to logarithmic factors for any
sequentially interactive and (ε, δ)-locally private protocol with sufficiently small δ. Using recent
subsequent work [18], we can also extend this result to the fully interactive setting, as shown in the
next section.
10.1 Extension to Fully Interactive Lower Bound
The following result, proven in subsequent work by Joseph et al. [18] also relying on the work
of Braverman et al. [6], gives a general lower bound for locally private simple hypothesis testing
problems like Test.
Lemma 10.7 (Theorem 5.3 in Joseph et al. [18]). For ε > 0 and δ <
min ( ε3α2
48n ln(2n/β) , ε
2
α
2
64n ln(n/β)e7ε ), any (ε, δ)-locally private simple hypothesis testing proto-
col distinguishing between distributions P0 and P1 with probability at least 2/3 requires
n = Ω( 1
ε2∥P0−P1∥2TV ) samples.
Since in general DKL(N(µ1, σ2)∣∣N(µ2, σ2)) ≤ [µ1−µ2σ ]2, in the setting of Test (n,M,σ) we
are distinguishing between P0 = N(0, σ2) and P1 = N(M,σ2) and get DKL(P0∣∣P1) = O (M2σ2 ).
Pinsker’s inequality then implies ∥P0−P1∥2TV = O (M2σ2 ). Substituting this into Lemma 10.7, we get
that distinguishingP0 and P1 with constant probability and n samples requiresM = Ω( σε√n). Thus,
for appropriately small δ, any (ε, δ)-locally private protocol that (α,β)-solves Estimate (n,M,σ)
has α = Ω(M) = Ω( σ
ε
√
n
).
11 Information Theory Overview
We briefly review some standard facts and definitions from information theory, starting with entropy.
Definition 11.1. The entropyH(X) of a random variableX is
H(X) =∑
x
P [X = x] ln ( 1
P[X=x]) ,
and the conditional entropyH(X ∣Y ) of random variableX conditioned on random variable Y is
H(X ∣Y ) = Ey[H(X ∣Y = y)].
Next, we can use entropy to define the mutual information between two random variables. Mutual
information between random variablesX and Y is roughly the amount by which conditioning on Y
reduces the entropy ofX (and vice-versa).
Definition 11.2. The mutual information I(X ;Y ) between two random variablesX and Y is
I(X ;Y ) =H(X) −H(X ∣Y ) =H(Y ) −H(Y ∣X),
and the conditional mutual information I(X ;Y ∣Z) betweenX and Y given Z is
I(X ;Y ∣Z) =H(X ∣Z)−H(X ∣Y,Z) =H(Y ∣Z) −H(Y ∣X,Z).
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We also define the related notion of KL-divergence.
Definition 11.3. The Kullback-Leibler divergence DKL(X ∣∣Y ) between two random variables X
and Y is
DKL(X ∣∣Y ) =∑
x
P [X = x] ln(P [X = x]
P [Y = x] ) ,
where we often abuse notation and let X and Y denote the distributions associated with X and Y .
KL divergence connects to mutual information as follows.
Fact 11.4. For random variablesX , Y , and Z ,
I(X ;Y ∣Z) = Ex,z [DKL ((Y ∣X = x,Z = z)∥(Y ∣Z = z))] .
Finally, we will also use the following connection between KL divergence and ∣∣ ⋅ ∣∣1 distance.
Lemma 11.5 (Pinsker’s inequality). For random variablesX and Y ,
∣∣X − Y ∣∣1 ≤√2DKL(X ∣∣Y ).
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